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164 PEOPLE 1'. MASON [54 C.2d 
[Crim. No. 6528. In Bank. May 17, 1960.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. ROBERT L. MASON, 
Appellant. 
[1] Homicide-Evidence-Deliberation and Premeditation.-A con-
viction of first degree murder on the theory that defendant had 
formed a deliberate and premeditated intent to kill the de-
ceased's daughter was sustained by evidence that over a period 
of time defendant developed a growing animosity toward the 
daughter either because of her rejection of him or accusations 
against him, such as that he attacked her on one occasion with 
his hands, on another occasion with a screw driver, and then 
with a recently-acquired gun, resulting in the death of her 
mother. (Pen. Code, § 189.) 
[2] Id.-Evidence.-A conviction of first degree murder could be 
sustained on the theory that the killing was perpetrated by 
means of lying in wait or was committed in the perpetration 
of burglary where there was evidence that he took a gun and 
entered the house of deceased's daughter through the back 
door, that he stayed in the house alone that night and the next 
day, and that when the daughter came home with her mother 
and son, defendant came out of the bedroom closet with gun 
in hand, shots were exchanged, the mother was killed, and the 
daughter was seriously injured. 
[3] Id.-Instructions-Killing by Lying in Wait.-Instructions in 
a homicide case as to killing by lying in wait did not eliminate 
malice aforethought as an essential ingredient of murder per-
petrated by means of lying in wait where they made clear that, 
although a specific intent to kill is not required to commit 
murder by lying in wait, it was necessary that there be the 
intentional inflicting of bodily injury on the person killed 
under circumstances likely to cause his death. 
[4] Id.-Murder in First Degree-Killing in Perpetration of Bur-
glary: Instructions. - Although the killing occurred in the 
house of deceased's daughter about 20 hours after defendant 
entered it, if the jury found that defendant committed burglary 
by entering the house with the intent to cOlllmit a felonious as-
sault, the homicide and burglary were parts of one continuous 
transaction, and the court did not err in instructing the jury 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Homicide, § 172 et seq.; Am.Jur., Homicide, 
§§ 464,465. 
[-1] SI'C Cal.Jur.2d, HOlllicid!', ~77:Am.Jur., HOlllieide, §39. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Homicide, § 1:j8; [2] Homicide, 
§ 145(3); [3] Homicide, § 185; [4] Homicide, §§ 15(6), 188; 
[5] Homicide, § 242. 
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that murder cOlllmittrd in the p('rpctration of burg-Inry is first 
deg-ree murder. 
[6] Id.-Punishment.--f::rlertion of life imprisonment or death :IS 
the punishment for first deg-rt.'c murder is within the absolute 
discretion of the jury. 
APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239, 
subd. (b» from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County and from an order denying a new trial. Mark 
Brandler, Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for murder and for assault with intent to 
murder. Judgment of conviction, imposing death penalty 
with reference to murder charge, affirmed. 
Carl B. Shapiro, under appointment by the Supreme Court, 
for Appellant. 
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, William E. James, As-
sistant Attorney General, and Jack E. Goertzen, Deputy 
Attorney General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-A jury found defendant guilty of the 
first degree murder of Suzan Jamerson and fi.~ed the penalty 
at death. It also found him guilty of an assault with a deadly 
weapon with intent to murder Rona Porrazzo, Suzan's daugh-
ter. (Pen. Code, § 217.) The trial court denied defendant's 
motion for a new trial and entered judgment on the verdicts. 
This appeal is automatic. (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).) 
Defendant met Rona and her husband several years before 
the homicide and was a frequent visitor at their home. On a 
Sunday afternoon in the summer of 1957, Rona came home 
after visiting her mother and found defendant alone in the 
house. An argument developed over a loan of $20 defendant 
claimed he made to Rona's mother, and Rona picked up the 
telephone to call her mother to ask about the loan. Defendant 
grabbed Rona and wrested the phone from her. Rona then 
said that she had to get ready to go to work, and defendant 
asked her to drop him off on her way, which she did. Rona 
complained about the incident to her husband, and he 8.$lted 
defendant not to come to the house when he was not there. 
Rona testified that on February 27, 1958 defendant came to 
the house in the evening after she had returned from church 
and put her 4-year-old son to bed. Her husband was at work 
at a nightclub as a musician. Defendant cntered, and they sat 
) 
) 
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in III(' ldtt')\('n urillkillg col1'('e and talking. About 12 :50 a. m. 
HOlla told drfl'lHlallt that it wn~ time to leaY<'. Defell(lant 
attempted to rmbra('.e hcr, and she pushed him away. He thc11 
threw her UOWl~ 011 a couch and attempted to chokc her, first 
with his hanus, and then with his necktie, which brokc. lIc 
accused her of bcing "more than friendly" and "that "'ay" 
with other friends aud complained that she would not even be 
nicc to him. Defendant left after Rona promised not to call i 
the police. Rona required medical treatment because of this 
attack, and she filed a criminal complaint against defendant. 
'1'he jury was unable to reach a verdid, and the action was 
uismissed. Defendant has at all times denied that he attacked 
Rona 011 February 27th or that he was at her home that 
evening. He testified that ROlla accused him to protect the 
perSOll who actually attacked her and that his subsequent 
meetings with her were to make her tell the truth about the 
February 27th incident. 
Because of fear of defendant and the fact that he had a key 
to their Hollywood home, Rona and her husband and son 
moved in May 1958 to a house in Glendale located behind a 
duplex where Rona's mother lived. 
About 1 :30 a.Ill. in the morning following Thanksgiving 
Day, 1958, Rona left the restaurant where she \vorked and 
went to her car at a nearby parking lot. She testified that 
defendant appeared, attacked her with his hands and fists, and 
threatened to kill her and her husband if she "put the finger" 
on him this time. Defendant testified that the meeting was 
prearranged and that Rona attacked him first by hitting him 
on the head with her shoe. After this encounter Rona's hus-
band bought her a gun, and they made arrangements so that 
Rona would not have to drive home from work alone. 
In January 1959 Rona's husband was working at a night-
club in Las Vegas and his mother and father were staying at 
the Glendale home with Rona and her son. Shortly after 2 a.m. 
Rona's supervisor drove her home from work, and her father-
in-law met her at the front door. She went toward the back 
of the house, which was dark, and defendant, who had entered 
surreptitiously through the back door or window, grabbed her 
arm, struck her on thc head with a scre\v driver, and dragged 
her through the kitchen toward the back door. She screamed 
and her mother-in-law and father-in-law came to her assist-
ance. Her father-in-law got the screw driver away from 
defendant, who then escaped. Owing to the darknes~, Rona 
could not identify defendant at the time, but he admitted at 
the trial that it "'as he who was involved ill this incident. 
. ) 
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R-Ollu's parents-in-law moved away from the Glendale home, 
and ROlla anu h('r SOil join('u ill'1' hu.'.lJalld in Las Vegas. The 
weekeJl(I befol'e 'J'u('fi(lay, Februlll'Y 17, 1939, Rona '8 husband 
jrove them ba~k to Gll'uuale. lIe returned to Las Vegas on 
Monday, l\ncl Ht.'!lU and her son moyed into her mother's home 
in the duplex on the fl'ont of the property. Rona was afraid ' 
to star alone in the house ill the rear. 
Early ill Fehruary d('felldallt arranged with a friend to buy 
a reyoh'er, and 011 the 16th of February they took it out ill 
the country and tested it. That night about 10 p.m. defendant 
took the gun aud entel'ed Hona's house through the back door. 
He testified that he had talked to Rona 011 the telephone and 
that she had asked him to eome. She testified that there was 
110 such eOllwrsatioll, DL'fendallt stayed in the house alone 
that uight and tlle Ilext day. About 6 or 6 :30 p.m. on Feb-
ruary 17th, Hona came home with her mother and son. She 
intended to retul'll to Las Vegas the next day. She wanted to 
get a sweater from her house before going into her mother's 
house and asked her mother and SOl1 to go ,vith her. She 
thought she had her gun in her eoat poeket at the time. After 
the three enterell the house, Rona saw "hat appeared to be 
an arm ill a coatsleeve showing through the opening in the 
bedroom closet door. She screamed and ran, and defendant 
came out of the closet with a gun in his hand. Shots were 
exehanged, and ROlla's mother was killed and Rona was seri-
ously injurrd by bullets from defendant's gun. Defendant 
eseaped and was subsequently arrested in Arizona. 
Defendant te!;tifieu that he took the loaded gun to Rona's 
home solcl." to frighten her so that she would tell the truth 
about the February 27th attack. He hid in the closet when he 
saw Rona approaching with her moth('r and son intending to 
wait thrre until they left to see Rona alone. R-Ona tried to pull 
the eloset door open and he tried to hold it closed. 'When he 
finally eame out of the closet, nona ran into the Ih:illg room 
and serenme(l. lIe t11rl1 ran into the liYing room and obseryed 
Rona's mot her stand i ng in a hall way oetwrcn the bedroom 
and ldtehen. A shot was fired and defendant drew his gun 
and started ::;hooting. 
Defendatit also testified that he commcnced having sexual 
relations with HOlla in 1957 and eontinued to do so until just 
before the attack of Fl'bruary 27, 1938, and there is evidence 
that he told Rona's husband that he had done so and otherwise 
sought to break up the marriage. Rona te!>tified that she had 
never had sexual relations with defendant . 
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[1] The evidence is suffieient to support the verdicts. 
\Vhatever resolution the jury made of the confliet between de-
fendant's and "Hona 's testimony with respect to the attack on 
Fehruary 27, 1958, and the events leading up to it, it could 
reasonahly conclude that thereafter defendant developed a 
growing animosity toward Rona either because of her rejection 
of him or accusations against him. Thus, he attacked her with 
his hands the day after Thanksgiying 1958, with a screw driver 
in January 1959, and with a recently-acquired gun Oil Febru-
ary 17, 1959. The jury could find that the last attack was a 
deliberate and premeditated attempt to kill Rona that re-
sulted in the death of her mother. Such a killing is murder of 
the first degree. (People v. Slttie, 41 Ca1.2d 483, 491-492 [261 
P.2d 241] ; Pen. Code, § 189.) 
[2] Ewn if the jury was not cOllvinced that defendant 
had formed a deliberate and premeditated intent to kill Rona, 
it could have concluded that the killing was murder of the 
first degree becau;:;e it was perpetrated by means of lying in 
wait or was committed in the perpetration of burglary. (Pen. 
Code, § 189.) [3] The jury was fully instructed on both of 
these theories, and contrary to defendant's contention, the 
lying in wait instructions did not eliminate malice aforethought 
as an essential ingredient of murder perpetrated hy means of 
lying in wait. The instructions were substantially those ap-
proved in People v. Atchley, 53 Ca1.2d 160, 175 [346 P.2d 
764], and made clear that although a specific intent to kill is 
not required to commit murder by lying in wait, "it is neces-
sary that there be the intentional inflicting of bodily injury 
upon the person killed under circumstances likely to cause his 
death." 
Defendant contcnds that thc trial court erred in instructing 
the jury with respect to murder committed in the perpetration 
of burglary on the ground that the burglary, if any, was com-
pleted when defendant entered the house with the intent to 
commit the felony of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. 
Code, § § 245, 459) and that therefore the killing about 20 
hours later was not committed in the perpetration of bur-
glary. 
In People v. Chavez, 37 Ca1.2d 656, 669-670 [234 P.2d 632], 
we stated: "The law of this state has ncver required proof 
of a strict causal relationship between the felony and the 
homicide. The statute was adopted for the protection of the 
community and its residents, 110t for the benefit of the law-
breaker, and thi~ court has viewed it as oln'iatillg the necessity 
for, ratlirr than re(juirillg, allY teelilli('al in!juiry eOlleerning 
)1a,)" 19GO] PE(lI'LE I'. l\L'\s(l~ 
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whether there has heen a l·ulIlplvti"!I. ahandollment, or de-
siste111'e o[ the f,'lony hero:'!' Ih(' homil'idl' ,'.'a~ ,·ompleted. 
"In People v. Boss, 210 CaJ. 24;), 2;')2, 2;)0 [2PO P. 881], 
this court said that the felony murdl'r rule' ... was adopteu 
to make punishment of this class of erime more certain. It 
was not intenued to relieve thewrollgdoer from allY probable 
consequences of his act by platillg a limitation upon the res 
gestae ,,,hieh is unreasonahle or unnatural.' The homicide is 
committrd in the perpetration of thc felony if the killing and 
felony are parts of one continuous transaction. (People v. 
Miller, ]21 Cal. 343 [53 P. 816].)" 
[ 4] Although the killing in the present ease occurreu 
about 20 hours after defendant ent!'l'ed the house, if the jury 
found that defendant eommitted burg-Iar)" by entering the 
house \vith the intcnt to e01l1111it a felonious assault, the homi-
cide and the burglary were parts of one ('olltinuons trans-
action. (See People v. Witt. 170 Cal. 104, 106 [148 P. 928] : 
People Y. Kdso, 25 Ca1.2<l 848, 851 [155 P.2d 819] ; People Y. 
Jfo1'lock, 46 Ca1.2d 141, 146-147 [292 P.2d 897); People v. 
Clteal'Y, 48 Ca1.2d 301, 310, 318 [309 P.2d 431} ; People v. 
Jones, 52 Ca1.2d 636, 651 [343 P.2d 577}.) ..:\.('cordingly, the 
trial court did not err in instructing the jury that murder 
committed ill the perpetration of burglary is murder of the 
first degree. 
[5] Defendant contends finally that it is a denial of due 
process of law to permit the jury to fix the penalty without 
prescribing standards to guide the exercise of its power. It 
is settled, however, that the seledion of life imprisonment or 
death as thc punishment for first degree murder is within 
the absolute discretion of the jury. (People v. Green, 47 
Ca1.2d 209, 232 [302 P.2d 307J ; People v. Friend, 47 Ca1.2d 
749,764-768 [306 P.2d 463] ; People v. JOlles, 52 Ca1.2d 636, 
652 [343 P.2<l 577}.) 
The judgment alld the order denying the motion for a new 
trial are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., White, J., 
and Dooling, J. pro tem.,· concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied June 14, 
1960 . 
• Assigllcll I.y Chainll;!n of Ju,lieial Council. 
